

“It’s a battle of right and wrong!”: A Critical Socio-Cognitive analysis of UKIP and Vox’s discourse

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1. Introduction

The far-right and right-wing populist movements in Europe have increasingly gained support in the last few decades (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). This phenomenon has led to an important debate on what the causes and consequences of the spread of this ideology are. The debate nowadays is mostly grounded in political science and sociology. However, there has been little linguistic research focusing on the discourse of right-wing populism, with few exceptions such as Wodak (2015). There seems to be, then, a need for linguistic research on these political parties, to see how they express themselves, what strategies they use, how they conceptualize (or want their audiences to conceptualize) the world, or how they try to legitimize their own policies and de-legitimize their opponents'.

Thus, given the lack of research on the field, the justification for a project which analyzes the discourse of the radical right in Europe becomes apparent. This project, then, will analyze and compare the discourses of the British party UKIP and the Spanish party Vox, within the field of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and from a socio-cognitive approach, with a special focus on metaphor analysis. The choice of two parties instead of one (or more than two) is not accidental. It is based on the assumption that studying only one party would not allow us to differentiate what is shared with other European parties from what is specific to that party; and analyzing more than two parties would exceed the scope of this project. Similarly, the choice of parties answers to, on the one hand, the sudden rise of Vox in Spanish politics (Castedo, 2019); and, on the other hand, the prominence of UKIP in British politics in the last decades (Ray, 2017), at least until 2019.

The analysis of right-wing populist discourses will be approached from a critical perspective, which means that it will not only try to draw conclusions from the use of language and metaphors of both parties, but also to analyze whether this use of language constitutes a form of legitimation of power abuse. Thus, belonging to the field of CDA, (Fairclough, 1989; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Dirven *et.al.*, 2007; van Dijk, 2008) this research will not be neutral in its objectives, which are based on the grounds that radical right discourses seek to reject diversity and promote social inequality. Instead, this project will be neutral in its analysis of the language, following a specific methodology (section 4). So, the research questions for this study are: 1) Do the metaphors used by UKIP and Vox reflect a right-wing populist ideology? 2) Are there differences in the way Vox and UKIP use metaphors? 3) Are UKIP and Vox's metaphors used to legitimize power abuse and social inequality?

So, to this aim, this project will be structured in the following way: the contexts of both UKIP and Vox (both ideological and historical) will be explained in section 2. In the Theoretical Background (section 3), the notions of Critical Discourse Analysis, van Dijk's socio-cognitive approach, the study of conceptual metaphor and the definition of far-right discourses will be explored. Section 4 will detail the data that has been compiled

and the methodology that will be followed. The analysis of the discourses will be done in sections 5 and 6. These results will be then compared and contrasted in the Discussion section (section 7); and finally, section 8 will provide a conclusion to the project, explaining as well the limitations of the study and some possible areas of further research.

2. Vox and UKIP: Background and ideology

2.1. Vox

2.1.1. Background

Vox is a Spanish political party founded in 2013 by a group of ex-members of the right-wing People's Party (PP). They disagreed with the PP with regard to the measures against the Catalan independence movement, the end of vasque terrorism (ETA) or tax policies, among other things (Gracia, 2014).

In 2014, Vox elected Alejo Vidal-Quadras, former vice-president of the European Parliament, its first president. He was then candidate for the 2014 European elections, but only won 1,57% of the votes, and therefore did not obtain any seat (Ministerio del Interior, 2014). After that, Vidal-Quadras renounced to the presidency of the party, and in September 2014, Santiago Abascal (its current leader, as of 2019) won a primary election and became the second president of Vox (Segurola, 2014).

Since 2014, Vox was an “outsider” in the Spanish political scene, not obtaining any representation in the regional elections in 2015, nor in the general elections of 2015 and 2016, with Abascal as the main candidate. However, that did not impede the party to continue with its political activism. In 2016, some of the leaders of the party extended a Spanish flag of big dimensions in Gibraltar, as part of its campaign to recover the sovereignty of the British territory (Zarzalejos, 2016). In 2017, Abascal participated in a European far-right summit in Koblenz (Germany). There, he had contacts with far-right leaders such as Marine Le Pen (French National Front), Frauke Petry (Alternative for Germany) or Geert Wilders (Holland's Party for Freedom) (Antequera, 2018). Nevertheless, the party's most mediatic action was its participation as private prosecution in the trial for the referendum of the independence of Catalonia on the 1st October, 2017, which allowed it to present itself as the most effective fighter against the independence movement (García, 2018).

These events, among other aspects, helped to make the party more visible in the Spanish society, which led to the 7th October, 2018, when Vox organized a political rally in the Vistalegre bullring, and gathered over nine thousand people, making a demonstration of force that had not been previously seen in the party (Lambertucci, 2018). This led to an increase of the media coverage the party usually had, appearing in all of the mainstream media, most of which maintained this coverage during the following months. In December 2018, Vox finally entered in the regional parliament of Andalusia,

obtaining 11% of the votes and 12 seats (RTVE, 2018), and becoming a necessary party to form government. Finally, in the general elections on the 28th April 2019, Vox entered the Spanish national parliament with 10% of the votes and 24 seats (out of 350) (RTVE, 2019).

2.1.2. Ideology

Vox has often been considered to belong to the far-right of the ideological spectrum, although its leaders deny this denomination. However, experts agree that Vox is ideologically close to far-right parties like the National Front in France, the Lega in Italy or Alternative for Germany, with some differences due to the particular circumstances of each nation (Castedo, 2019).

Vox's ideology revolves around a key set of ideas, most of which are often repeated in their leaders' discourses and appear in their official documents. In their political program for the general elections of 2019 (Vox, 2019), the majority of the measures were related to these areas:

- A radical **economic liberalism**, based on significant cuts in public expenses, a liberalization of commerce and drastic tax reductions.
- **Nationalism**: public aids for Spaniards, healthcare for Spaniards, priority of Spanish language in education over other regional languages, etc. In addition to this, the territorial (and linguistic) unity of the nation is a key point in their program.
- **Anti-immigration**: deportation of all illegal immigrants, limitations of legal immigration (to privilege those immigrants coming from friendly countries), building a wall in the Morocco border.
- **Anti-Islam**: avoid Islam from being taught at public schools, limit the building of mosques, and expulsion of radical Muslims.
- **Anti-feminism and LGBT movement**: Ban public assistance in abortions and gender reassignment surgery, repeal the laws against gender violence, protection of the "natural family", stop financing "radical" feminist associations.
- **Defense of family, Catholic values and Spanish traditions**: protection of natural family, creation of a Ministry of Family, anti-abortion laws, defense of bullfighting and hunting,
- **Security and order**, based on measures like strengthening the police and military forces, legalizing life imprisonment, increasing border security and extending the right of self-defense so that citizens can defend their homes.

2.2. UKIP

2.2.1. Background

The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) is a British political party whose main goal is to withdraw the UK from the European Union. It was created in 1993 out of the Anti-Federalist League, led by the academic Alan Sked (Hayton, 2016: 401), a party that appeared as a reaction against the Maastricht Treaty, which founded the European Union. Even though the party fared poorly in the elections (both European and general) following its creation, it made a breakthrough in the 1999 European elections, where it obtained three seats (Merrick, 2017). This was possible due to the electoral system for the EU elections, based on proportional representation; which contrasts with UK's first-past-the-post system, in which only the candidate with most votes wins the seat.

UKIP kept on growing in the following years, obtaining better results in each European election (although in general elections it was still a marginal party), and even reaching the second position in the 2009 European elections, with more than 16% of the votes (BBC News, 2009). Nevertheless, its biggest electoral success came in the European elections of 2014, when UKIP obtained 27,5% of the votes and became "the first party in more than a century, other than Labour or the Conservatives, to win the most votes" (Merrick, 2017) in a national election, under the leadership of Nigel Farage. It was this success of the Eurosceptic party that forced UK's Prime Minister David Cameron to call the referendum of June 2016 to leave the European Union.

After the British people voted to withdraw from the European Union, the main objective of UKIP being accomplished, Nigel Farage resigned as leader of the party, and then followed a "turbulent succession contest" (Ray, 2017), leaving the party extremely divided (there were four leaders in the two years following Farage's resignation). The party lost most of its electoral support in the subsequent elections, losing more than 10% of the votes in the 2017 general election, under the leadership of Paul Nuttall, and more than 24% of the votes in the 2019 European election, under Gerard Batten (Quinn, 2019). The party no longer holds (as of 2019) any representation in the House of Commons or in the European Parliament, but its discourse has been inherited by The Brexit Party, created in early 2019 by Nigel Farage.

2.2.2. Ideology

UKIP has often been defined as a right-wing populist party (Wodak, 2015; Jones, 2011). Populism "is understood as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite,"" (Mudde, 2007). UKIP's political agenda is focused on one main objective: to achieve the UK's withdrawal from the European Union.

Nevertheless, the party, which has run for national and local elections, also has a political agenda besides Brexit. Following the party's *Interim Manifesto* (UKIP, 2018)

that may be found on UKIP's official webpage, some of the key policies of the party have been extracted:

- **Nationalism:** Public services such as the National Health System or the access to public housing should be restricted to British citizens only.
- **Anti-immigration:** UKIP supports ending mass immigration, with a special focus on migrants coming from Islamic countries. Illegal immigration is to be stopped, and legal immigration, strongly restricted. Only qualified immigrants are to be allowed, depending on the needs of the UK. Harder controls on UK's borders.
- **International aid:** UKIP wants the money budgeted for Overseas Aid to be cut drastically, because it only helps to support corrupt regimes. This money is to be invested in the UK.
- **Climate change:** anthropogenic climate change is a "dogma". UKIP defends the withdrawal from the Climate Change Act of 2008, on the basis that its objectives are unattainable and costly.
- **Economic liberalism:** reduction of taxation for almost all sectors of society.
- **Electoral system:** reform of the electoral system, increasing proportionality and representation for smaller parties.
- **Free speech:** repeal of the concepts of 'hate speech' and 'political correctness', which have been imposed in society by Cultural Marxism.

It must be taken into account that, since Gerard Batten became leader of UKIP in 2018, the party has been accused of embracing far-right positions (Quinn, 2019), so this program may not be the exact same as the ones published in previous years, under other leaders of the party.

3. Theoretical background

3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is an expanding trend in the field of linguistics, and more specifically, within the area of discourse analysis. Throughout the years, many scholars have defined what they thought CDA was, and these definitions were not always completely similar. Let's depart from van Dijk's definition:

Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose and ultimately resist social inequality (van Dijk, 2008: 85)

As we can see, CDA is not depicted as a method of analysis, but as an independent area of research. Also important is the emphasis on social inequality: there is no doubt that CDA is not neutral, in the sense that it has clear political and social goals, which are to analyze and expose power relations of dominance and abuse established through discourse. Language, then, is considered to be essential in the reproduction of social relations, and more specifically, in those involving inequality.

This view is shared by most scholars, but others have modified it or added other factors that are not taken into account here. For instance, van Dijk's definition is focused on the goals of CDA, but not in the methodologies and theoretical tenets needed to achieve these goals. So, in order to have a fuller understanding of what CDA is, it could be appropriate to look at some of its core concepts: *discourse*, *ideology* and *power*.

The notion of discourse has been greatly discussed in all branches of linguistics (as well as in other social sciences), and there is no agreement on what it refers to. Some scholars believe that discourse is any unit of language longer than the sentence (so, a small text could be a piece of discourse). On the other hand, discourse has also been extended to an entity larger than the text, and even the individual; sometimes referring to institutions (the discourse of the United Nations) or to groups sharing ideological principles (racist discourse). In order to avoid this misunderstanding, Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 260) tried to explain what discourse was within CDA. They argued that "CDA sees discourse – language use in speech and writing – as a form of 'social practice'". Discourse and society have a bi-directional relation: discourse constitutes the social reality, but the social reality conditions discourse. Following this, there is no doubt that discourse can also contribute to the creation and reproduction of social inequality.

Ideology is also a key term in CDA. According to van Dijk (2006a: 116-117), there are four basic assumptions when we speak about ideologies: they are "*belief systems*" (as opposed to specific practices), they are "*socially shared*" by the members of a group or community, they are "*fundamental*" beliefs (they control attitudes and other beliefs), and they are "*gradually* acquired and [...] relatively *stable*". The connection between ideology and discourse is thus made explicit through these assumptions: if discourse is defined as a social practice, then it must be grounded in a belief system (or a set of them). Nevertheless, van Dijk's basic assumptions do not take into account the unconscious level of ideologies. People reproduce social practices without thinking, because they may be "common sense" (in other words, ideological), and this usually embodies "assumptions which directly or indirectly legitimize existing power relations" (Fairclough, 1989: 33).

The third main concept in CDA is that of *power*. Although, previously, power was based on "coercive force", Gramsci argued that nowadays it is also based on "*hegemony*" (winning the consent of the majority)" (Wodak, 2013: xxviii). Also interesting is the difference between *power in discourse* and *power over discourse* (Holzscheiter, 2005: 69, quoted in Wodak, 2013: xxviii). *Power in discourse* refers to the actors' struggle over the interpretations of meaning; while *power over discourse* means having the capacity and social position to make your discourse public.

There are no clear methodologies in CDA, because it borrows its techniques of analysis from other fields, such as traditional discourse analysis, conceptual metaphor studies, political sciences, etc. Thus, CDA is often considered as “discourse study *with an attitude*” (van Dijk, 2015: 496), i.e. a critical perspective towards the study of language. Other scholars also consider CDA a “shared perspective encompassing a range of approaches” (Todolí Cervera *et al*, 2006: 9), or a “research enterprise, [...] diverse and interdisciplinary” (Hart, 2010: 14). So, there seems to exist a certain agreement on what CDA is: a critical attitude within linguistic research, which aims to uncover how abusive and dominant social relations are produced and reproduced through discourse.

3.2. Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive model

As it has been explained the previous section, within the field of CDA there is not a common perspective towards research, nor in the theoretical notions that must be applied. Thus, several authors have tried to explore CDA from different perspectives. One of these authors was van Dijk. He tried to combine traditional discourse studies, social studies and cognitive studies, and developed the *socio-cognitive model* (van Dijk, 1995, 2009, 2018). Van Dijk argued that we could not understand how discourse and social characteristics relate to each other without the mediation of cognitive processes.

There are three key notions in the socio-cognitive model: memory, mental models and social cognition. First, it is relevant to highlight that cognitive processes “take place in the **mind** or **memory** of individual **social actors as members** of social groups and communities” (van Dijk, 2018: 29). Therefore, all linguistic and discursive devices are grounded in memory. There are also different kinds of memory; the most relevant being *Short Term Memory* (STM) and *Long Term Memory* (LTM). The interaction between both of them is essential to understand how discourse is produced and comprehended (STM deals with the immediate storing of information, while LTM involves our knowledge of the world, our belief systems, etc.).

Secondly, *mental models* are “subjective representations of events or situations” (van Dijk, 2018: 30). Mental models are created when we are involved in any event, either by observation, direct participation, reading, listening, etc. Mental models store not only the event itself, but also the emotions and opinions that we may have about it. They are individual, but this does not mean that they cannot be influenced by the context or the social situation. According to Van Dijk, mental models include a Setting, Participants and Actions (elements which are then linguistically expressed in the structure of the sentence).

Thirdly, the notion of *social cognition* is also essential in this model. We have considered mental models to be individual, but Van Dijk argues that there are other types of cognitions in humans, which are socially shared. For instance, we share within our community a certain sociocultural knowledge about the world, as well as particular ideologies, norms or values. The main point is that we do not produce discourse individually, but as “social actors and members of groups, communities, organizations or

institutions” (*Ibid*). Logically, mental models, which are individual, are also influenced by our social context, since all of our experiences are interpreted through the social “filter”. Thus, it follows that our mental models will be similar to the models of other members of our communities.

The relationship of all these concepts to the analysis of discourse becomes now clear. Both our sociocultural knowledge, our mental models, etc. will influence our linguistic choices. For instance, if we understand the metaphor *the tsunami of immigration* as carrying a negative evaluation about immigrants it is because we have a mental model of a tsunami that carries evaluative information related to danger or destruction.

Following the socio-cognitive model, then, it seems crucial that we do not limit our view to a traditional analysis of discourse. If we explore the cognitive process behind the text, we may be able to understand it and interpret it more completely. It is necessary to find out the mental models of the author, as well as the social sphere he belongs to, because that will give us key information about how he understands the world, and the reasons behind his discourse choices.

3.3. Metaphor and persuasion

The field of conceptual metaphor has greatly developed in the last four decades. Before this, metaphor was mainly considered to be a rhetoric figure used for literary purposes. It wasn’t until Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that this view began to change. Nowadays, most scholars agree that metaphor is a cognitive process, rather than a rhetoric one; which takes place in our mind and only after that is reflected in the language. In other words, humans naturally and unconsciously conceptualize things (usually, more complex) in terms of other things (usually, simpler). A conceptual metaphor can be defined as the partial mapping of properties between a source domain and a target domain. The source domain is the (usually simple) concept from which we extract properties that we apply to the (usually complex) target domain. For example, in the conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY, MONEY is the source domain. We know that money, a relatively simple concept, is a valuable and limited commodity, and we apply these properties onto the more complex concept of TIME. This conceptual mapping of properties is later represented in the language through linguistic metaphors. That is why, even if time is not really a currency or a valuable object, the following examples make sense: *I like to spend my time on..., you’re wasting my time, he lives on borrowed time*, etc. (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 8).

The fact that conceptual metaphor is a cognitive tool is not a banal one. In fact, this would mean that whenever we make use of a conceptual metaphor, we are, in a way, showing how our mind works, how we conceptualize the world. This is essential in the field of CDA, because metaphor analysis can be one of the most useful tools to uncover dominant or abusive ideologies in discourse. There have been several studies that explored this view. For instance, Dirven *et al.* (2007) explored the discourse of economy,

where, due to the capitalist system, we may find metaphors of competition or conflict, such as “BUSINESS IS A JUNGLE”, “COMPANIES ARE PREDATORS AND PREY”, “BUSINESS IS WAR”, etc. (Dirven *et al.*, 2007:1225). The first two metaphors represent a state of affairs in which in order to succeed, a company must be ruthless, it can either kill or be killed. The third metaphor also implies competition, but including a notion of strategy, of analyzing the situation, etc. Metaphors hide some aspects of a reality and hide others; in this example they highlight fight, domination or ‘every man for himself’, while hiding concepts like collaboration, mutual benefit or social responsibility.

However, metaphor is not only useful to uncover how the speaker thinks; it can also be used to persuade (or even manipulate) the audience, taking advantage of its unconscious nature. This was examined, among others, by Charteris-Black (2011), who explained that persuasion in political discourse could be carried out, with metaphor, “through a process of foregrounding and revealing some aspects of a political issue and at the same time concealing other aspects by putting them into the background” (Charteris-Black, 2011:36). Thus, when Margaret Thatcher spoke about how to “give back heart to our cities” (Charteris-Black, 2011:41), using the conceptual metaphor CONSERVATIVE POLICY IS A LIFE FORCE, she was only highlighting the positive results of her policies (and not the negative ones), in an attempt to persuade voters to stick to the Conservative Party.

Other study related to metaphor and persuasion was that of Thibodeau and Boroditsky (2013), who designed and performed an experiment to demonstrate how metaphors regarding social policies could influence reasoning without the hearer’s conscious knowledge. They found that seeing CRIME either as a BEAST or as a VIRUS caused the participants to choose different crime-reduction programs, more directed towards reforms in the VIRUS case, and towards enforcement in the BEAST case. Even in cases where the participants did not consciously identify the metaphors, this influence took place. Thus, metaphor may be used to persuade the public opinion and gather support for different policies, even in a surreptitious way.

Through a careful use of metaphor, discourses which were not considered acceptable previously can be slowly legitimized, and eventually become accepted. It was the case, for example, with terrorism metaphors in post 9-11 USA. For example, this was analyzed by Spencer (2012), regarding metaphors that use TERRORISM as the target domain. One of the examples is TERRORISM IS WAR, a conceptual metaphor that is used in order to justify certain political measures: for instance, in a war, military expenses are greatly increased, civil liberties limited, criticism is considered treason, etc. (Spencer, 2012:402-404). Therefore, by using this metaphor, politicians construct a social reality in which these policies seem appropriate, when in reality they are not, because a terrorism situation is not the same as a war situation. From a similar perspective, Bhatia (2009) analyzed metaphor in the discourse of terrorism with a focus on the Bush administration, arguing that metaphor is persuasive because it transfers “positive or negative associations of various source words to a metaphor target” (Bhatia, 2009:280). After 9/11, the Bush administration started utilizing conceptual metaphors like TERRORISM IS

EVIL/LAWLESSNESS/BARBARISM/TYRANNY (which implied that the USA was the opposite, i.e. USA is GOOD/LAWFUL/CIVILIZED/FREEDOM). Bhatia argued that these metaphors contributed to the creation of a division, a *us vs. them* that justified the Bush administration political measures against the Middle East (specifically, the war in Iraq). In this example, metaphors were important in the polarization between the two worlds, and in the construction of a reality in which the USA was *good*, while the Middle East was *evil*.

Lakoff explored, regarding as well the USA conflicts in the Middle East, how metaphors could be combined with the use of “narratives that have the structure of fairy tales” (Lakoff, 2003), in order to increase their persuasion. In other words, through metaphors, we may artificially create a state of affairs that fits into a story schema. This schema contains all the elements of a basic fairy tale: a Hero, a Villain, an initial crime which causes the conflict, etc. Metaphors are useful to create the elements of the story: Regarding the second Gulf War, the Bush administration depicted Saddam Hussein as an ‘all evil’ Villain, while it spoke of itself as an ‘all good’ victim of Saddam’s crimes (*Ibid*). The use of narratives is not accidental: it draws on our deepest cultural background and provides a powerful affective component, because, traditionally, we are positioned against the Villains and want them to fail, while we feel identified with the Heroes and want them to succeed (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1981). Nevertheless, the use of the story schema implies adapting and modifying the existing reality to fit a very simple structure of good vs. evil, so it can be seen as a strategy of oversimplification, or even manipulation.

3.4. Far-right discourses

The far-right cannot be considered a recent phenomenon in the world, nor in Europe. Mudde (2012: 2) traces what he calls the ‘third wave’ of radical right populism in Europe back to the 1980s; a trend that began in the Scandinavian countries and spread towards Western Europe. This third wave has achieved several electoral successes, such as entering governments (Austria, Italy, Hungary and Poland); supporting the existing government (Denmark) or becoming second or third force (Holland, France, Switzerland, Finland or Germany). Other major achievements have been the vote to leave the European Union in the United Kingdom, promoted by the right-populist UKIP, or the entrance with around 10% of the votes in the Spanish national Parliament for the first time in four decades. In the elections for the European Parliament in 2019, the far-right and right-populist parties obtained around 20% of the votes (Mudde, 2019).

In the last years, there has been a small academic debate on how to name these parties, and no agreement has been reached. Some scholars argue that they are ‘populist radical right parties’, or PRRP (Mudde, 2012). Others prefer to use ‘far-right’ or ‘extreme right’ (Charalambous, 2015), and others, ‘right-wing populism’ (Wodak, 2015). There are many more ways to categorize them (see Mudde, 2007: 11-12) but in any case, they all refer to the same political parties in Europe, which share most of their ideological agendas, with

small differences that possibly depend on the particular characteristics and idiosyncrasies of each country.

There are various ways in which we can explore what far-right parties in Europe have in common. First, we could start by analyzing what having a right-wing ideology means. Lakoff (2002) argued that right-wing ideology is based on a strict-father model of family, while progressive thinking is based on a nurturing parents' family. These two moral systems were deeply explored to explain how ideologies are shaped. The strict-father model of family explains that the father is the central figure of the family, responsible for taking care of the rest of the members. Authority plays a key role in the model, and obedience must be rewarded, while disobedience, punished. Self-discipline is encouraged. Competition is also essential, since it allows to see who can survive in the difficult world we live in, who has work hard enough, and had enough self-discipline to earn rewards. Thus, rewarding or benefitting people who have not earned it through hard work is immoral, because it corrupts the competition system. Similarly, restraining competition in any way is also negative, because competition is seen as the natural way to thrive in the world. According to this model, pursuing self-profit is also positive, because that way, the profit of all will be increased. In the end, the strict father must: "Protect the family in the dangerous world", "support the family in the dangerous world" and "teach his children right from wrong" (Lakoff, 2004: 7).

Lakoff's model may be applied to the far-right, but also to the traditional right, so the ideological differences (if they exist) must be found elsewhere. Taking into account, as it has been exposed, that the far-right is not a unified movement, it cannot be denied that they share a series of ideas, in the core of which are a radical economic liberalism and anti-elitism. Nevertheless, these are not the only main ideas. The following common characteristics of the European far-right have been extracted from Wodak (2015: 90-91):

- Nativist politics, based on the conception of a homogenous community
- There is a homeland, 'us', which must be protected against dangerous outsiders, 'them' (physical outsiders, like immigrants, or ideological outsiders, like the left)
- Historical revisionism, where they construct a narrative based on heroes ('us') versus villains ('them')
- Conspiracy theories, explaining that the media and the establishment (banks, multinational enterprises, opposing parties) conspire against them.
- Defense of conservative values and morals: reaction against feminist or LGBT movements and maintenance of social status quo
- Support of 'common sense' and simplistic explanations, and need of a charismatic leader who wants to help "the man and woman on the street", but also has Lakoff's role of the strict father

These ideological tenets are then reflected on their discourse. Following Wodak (2015: 91) again, we can emphasize several discursive strategies: first, the construction of a Manichean reality of 'us' vs 'them', realized by positive self- and negative other-presentation. Second, the use of fallacies like *ad hominem arguments*, *hasty*

generalizations or *shifting of blame*. Third, the construction of myths to support a historical revisionism. Fourth, the spread of lies and rumors to justify the alleged conspiracies against them. And finally, Wodak speaks of the strategies of *calculated ambivalence* and *provocation*, which allows them to set the agenda in the media. That way, they can promote their discourse.

4. Data and Methodology

4.1. Data

This project is based on two corpora, one containing speeches from the Spanish party Vox, and the other speeches from the British party UKIP. Given the lack of a proper corpus of Vox or UKIP's public discourses, I collected and transcribed the texts following several criteria:

1. More than one sample from each party was needed, because an individual sample could be biased by the specific political circumstances in which the speech was pronounced.
2. The speeches of the same party could not be from the same period of time, which might as well bias the analysis.
3. Not any speaker was valid; the speaker should represent the party in its totality (or at least, as much of the party as was possible).
4. It was not possible to choose specific fragments, the choice of which might bias the analysis. Instead, the whole speech was analyzed.
5. The speeches should not be monothematic, as that would bias the choice of language. Instead, the speeches chosen covered a variety of topics
6. Not any genre of document was valid; for instance, an interview would be influenced by the interests of the journalist. Political rallies, conferences and talks, where there is a minimal interaction with the audience, were preferred.
7. The speeches could not be spontaneous; they should be written or prepared in advance (even if they were orally transmitted), to avoid as best as possible improvisation, which might not exactly reflect the party's ideology.

Based on these criteria, I compiled five speeches from each party, all made at conferences, talks and rallies; the speaker being the party leader at the moment. These

speeches were extracted from videos uploaded to YouTube (the links of which are in the Appendix). The period of time chosen is 2015-2019, with one speech per party and year. Here is a relation of the texts and their particular contexts:

4.1.1. Vox speeches

2015 speech, January: 3,839 words. The party is barely one year old. It has only run for the 2014 European elections, in which it did not obtain any representation, and is now campaigning for the 2015 Spanish general elections. The speech is given at an event commemorating the first year of the party. The speaker is Santiago Abascal, Vox's leader.

2016 speech, August: 3,909 words. Vox has lost the general elections of 2016, and barely obtained any representation (less than 0.5%) in the local elections. This speech is a talk called *Political parties and the Spanish nation*. It was given by Santiago Abascal to the members of foundation 'Denaes'¹. The Q&A section was not included.

2017 speech, November: 4,387 words. The Catalan process of independence marks this speech, which was given less than two months after the illegal referendum of independence and the unilateral declaration of independence. The speaker is Santiago Abascal, and the speech is part of a series of conferences he is giving called *The future of Spain*.

2018 speech, October: 3,208 words. Vox holds its biggest political rally, with more than 9,000 attendees, in the bullring of Vistalegre (former 'stronghold' of the left party Podemos). The party's media presence has grown due, among other things, to their hard opposition to the Catalan independentists. The speaker is Santiago Abascal.

2019 speech, April: 3,887 words. After succeeding in the Andalusian regional elections with more than 10% of the votes, this is the final campaign act for the general elections on the 28th April. The speech criticizes the left government and the Catalan separatists. It is given by Santiago Abascal in Madrid's Columbus Square.

The total number of words in Vox's corpus is 19,230.

4.1.2. UKIP speeches

2015 speech, November: 3,893 words. UKIP won the European elections of 2014 in the UK, which prompted David Cameron to call a referendum to leave the EU. This speech belongs to the campaign to leave the EU carried by UKIP and is deeply influenced

¹ Denaes (Defense of the Spanish Nation) is a right-wing and Spanish nationalist foundation created by Santiago Abascal, whose main goal is to promote the knowledge of the 'Spanish nation'.

by the terrorist attacks in Paris that same month. The speaker is Nigel Farage, leader of UKIP.

2016 speech, February: 3,779 words. Similarly, this speech is also part of the campaign to leave the EU. It was given by Nigel Farage, leader of the party, in the party's Spring Conference. The main topic is Brexit.

2017 speech, February: 1,765 words. After winning the referendum to leave the EU, UKIP reflects on how the process to renounce membership should take place, and its expected consequences. After Nigel Farage's resignation in 2016, Paul Nuttall gives this speech as new leader of the party in its Spring Conference.

2018 speech, September: 4,828 words. UKIP has lost a series of elections and has barely avoided bankruptcy. The speech, given in the party's conference, is focused on the party's desire for Brexit to be carried out, two years after the referendum; but also, on the internal affairs of the party. The speaker is Gerard Batten, new leader of the party after Paul Nuttall's resignation.

2019 speech, March: 8,304 words. Similarly to the previous one, the claim for Brexit to be completed is still the backbone of this speech. The party is campaigning for the European elections of 2019. The speaker is Gerard Batten.

The total number of words in UKIP's corpus is 22,569.

4.2. Methodology

After selecting the speeches, they were digitally transformed into audio files and manually transcribed using the corpus tool Transana. Since the focus of the project is not prosody, no transcription conventions were used. Punctuation marks were placed following grammatical rules, and paragraph divisions were made at my discretion, trying to maintain the units of meaning. The speeches were then categorized according to speaker, date (year and month), and, if available, place.

After this process of transcription, the documents were first analyzed using the informatic tool Lancsbox (Brezina *et al.*, 2015); a corpus tool that, among many other functions, provides a list of the most frequent words (lemmatized) in a specific corpus. From this list of words, the particular lists of most frequent nouns in each corpus were manually obtained. These nouns would be used to make a first contact with Vox and UKIP's discourses, to see what their main topics of interest are. They were then organized in tables with the 50 most frequent nouns (tables 1 and 2).

The texts were then analyzed manually to identify the metaphors. All the linguistic metaphors that could be found were retrieved and classified according to source domain. 352 metaphors were found in Vox's speeches, and 336 in UKIP's. The most frequent source domains were then classified in two tables (tables 3 and 4), for Vox and UKIP, respectively. These tables were made in order to provide readers with a simple account

of the source domains both parties mainly draw from. It must be remembered, however, that quantitative analysis is not the main goal of this project, but rather a way to orient the reader through the data.

Even though it has been pointed out that identifying conceptual metaphors is a subjective process (Goatly, 2007: 20), and some attempts to systematize this analysis have been unsuccessful (Burnes, 2011), for this project, two different metaphor identification methods were applied: Metaphorical Pattern Analysis (Stefanowitsch, 2006) and Metaphor Identification Procedure (Pragglejaz Group, 2007). First, Stefanowitsch's 2006 approach was followed by selecting and searching expressions or lexical items that refer to the target domain in question, and continued by deciding whether or not these items are part of a metaphorical expression. And second, MIP was applied afterwards by searching for the possible metaphorical mappings in the dictionaries *Cambridge Online Dictionary* and *Oxford English Online Dictionary*.

Given the scope of this project, not all the metaphors and source domains collected could be analyzed. A selection of them was made, focusing on the elements both corpora had in common, as well as some of the most important differences. So, it was decided that the main analysis would be centered on the use of WAR metaphors, metaphors on IMMIGRATION and ISLAM and metaphors on SPAIN (for Vox) and the UK/EU (for UKIP). Then, sub-sections would be created to analyze some of the particular metaphors used by each party. The choice of fields of analysis, then, was partially based on the frequent source domains found in the text, but also partially discretionary. As a conclusion, the relationship of metaphors and the story schema in each party's discourse would be explained. The findings of the analysis would then be contrasted, discussed and related to the main theoretical tenets in the Discussion section (section 7).

4.3. Tables

Table 1. Most frequent nouns (lemmatized) in Vox's speeches

Frequent nouns (lemmas)	Absolute frequency		
España - <i>Spain</i>	184	punto - <i>point</i>	21
Vox	68	gobierno - <i>government</i>	21
español - <i>Spaniard</i>	60	parte - <i>part</i>	21
estado - <i>state</i>	49	ciudadano - <i>citizen</i>	20
partido - <i>party</i>	43	gente - <i>people</i>	20
cosa - <i>thing</i>	39	país - <i>country</i>	20
libertad - <i>freedom</i>	38	vida - <i>life</i>	19
Europa - <i>Europe</i>	33	separatista - <i>separatist</i>	19
vez - <i>time</i>	31	lengua - <i>language</i>	17
verdad - <i>truth</i>	30	Cataluña - <i>Catalonia</i>	17
hijo - <i>son</i>	28	derecho - <i>right</i>	17
miedo - <i>fear</i>	28	medio - <i>media</i>	17
nación - <i>nation</i>	27	familia - <i>family</i>	16
autonomía - <i>autonomy</i>	27	pueblo - <i>people</i>	16
patria - <i>homeland</i>	26	gracia - <i>grace</i>	15
unidad - <i>unity</i>	26	padre - <i>father</i>	15
político - <i>politician</i>	24	“progres” – “ <i>progressives</i> ”	14
día - <i>day</i>	23	crisis - <i>crisis</i>	14
ley - <i>law</i>	23	historia - <i>history/story</i>	14
persona - <i>person</i>	23	idea - <i>idea</i>	13
manera - <i>way</i>	22	sentido - <i>sense</i>	13
año - <i>year</i>	22	abuelo - <i>grandfather</i>	13
valor - <i>value/courage</i>	22	golpe - <i>coup</i>	13
casa - <i>house</i>	21	proyecto - <i>project</i>	12
		constitución - <i>constitution</i>	12
		tiempo - <i>time</i>	12

Table 2. Most frequent nouns in UKIP's speeches (lemmatized)

Frequent nouns (lemmas)	Absolute frequency
people	150
country	103
European Union	95
UKIP	83
year	69
party	63
things	65
referendum	56
trade	48
policy	48
immigration	41
course	41
law	38
time	37
something	37
parliament	36
election	34
Britain	32
Brexit	29
government	29
money	29
way	29
right	28
agreement	27

member	26
world	26
minister	24
deal	24
problem	24
vote	23
Labour	23
day	23
system	23
month	21
place	20
week	20
democracy	18
job	18
Cameron	18
house	16
UK	16
Europe	15
control	14
today	14
number	14
politics	14
lot	14
border	14
community	14
business	14

Table 3. Most frequent source domains in Vox's speeches

Source domains	Absolute frequency
WAR	78
HUMAN BEING (personification)	60
PHYSICAL ENTITY	41
BUILDING/CONTAINER	25
LIVING ENTITY	10
COUP D'ÉTAT	9
TOOL	7
Dictatorship	6
WATER	6
TREASON/BETRAYAL	5
THIEF/CRIMINAL	5
CRIME	5
DEGRADATION	5

Table 4. Most frequent source domains in UKIP's speeches

Source domains	Absolute frequency
WAR	48
PHYSICAL ENTITY	37
HUMAN BEING (personification)	37
BUILDING/CONTAINER	20
STOLEN PHYSICAL ENTITY	17
UP	12
DOWN	8
THREAT	7
PRODUCT	6
JOURNEY	6
LIVING ENTITY	6
WATER	5
TEST/TRIAL	4
MIXTURE/SUBSTANCE	4

5. Analysis of Vox's speeches

This section will focus on the analysis of Vox's speeches. The links to the speeches are located in the Appendix section. I will begin by looking at the most frequent nouns, in order to find whether they coincide with the party's political program (that has been described in earlier sections). Frequent nouns will also be analyzed to see what topics the party is most interested in, in order to provide the reader with an introduction to its discourse. The main part of the analysis will focus on the use of metaphors, and how these metaphors carry a heavy ideological load in order to persuade the audience to join their party, vote for them, etc. In combination with this, I will also look at other ideological

elements that attempt to influence and modify our mental frames² regarding some of Vox's key political measures, such as the use of story schemas (Lakoff, 2003).

5.1. Frequent nouns

As mentioned in the Methodology section, the first step in the analysis of Vox's speeches are the nouns that are most frequently used, which could hint at what their main topics of interest are. All nouns in Table 1 have been lemmatized, in order not to include inflections of the same word. The list has been manually obtained from the corpus tool Lancsbox (Brezina *et al.*, 2015).

As we can see in Table 1 on page 20, the most prominent word by far is *Spain* (184 instances), which already points out to a focus on the nation (an idea supported by other nouns like *Spaniard*, *nation*, *homeland*, etc.). Nationalism, as has already been exposed, is a key topic in far-right discourse. Nationalism is also related to the process of independence in Catalonia, which is also one of Vox's favorite topics, taking into account the frequency of words like *coup*, *unity*, *separatist*, or *Catalonia*.

Other relevant words are consistent with Vox's political agenda: the defense of traditional *family* (notice as well *son*, *father*, *grandfather*), respecting the *law* (*rights*, *constitution*), the *language* issue or the defense of *values*. Some of their main criticized topics are represented in the list as well: *Europe* (usually referring to the European Union), *politicians*, the *separatists*, progressive people (through the derogative "*progres*"), the *media* and the state of *autonomies* (regional division in Spain).

5.2. Metaphor analysis

In Vox's sub corpus, 352 metaphors have been analyzed. In Table 2 on page 21, we may see the frequency of each of the most common source domains that appear in all five speeches. In this section, thus, we will focus on the analysis of certain metaphors: metaphors of WAR, SPAIN metaphors, metaphors associated with IMMIGRATION and ISLAM, and finally, some metaphors that, although not as common, are key to understand the way Vox conceptualizes some of its main ideological tenets.

² Frames are knowledge structures that we hold in our long-time memory. They are "continually updated and modified due to ongoing human experience" (Evans & Green, 2006: 223)

5.2.1. Metaphors of WAR

Out of all the metaphors that may be found in the corpus of Vox's speeches, WAR metaphors are, undoubtedly, the most frequent ones: 78 out of 352 (over 22%). This means that Vox draws heavily on the concept of warfare in order to structure its public discourse.

- (1) las oligarquías cobardes [...] se han rendido y por eso han abandonado el campo sin pelear y defender lo que a todos nosotros nos pertenece (2015)
the coward_oligarchies [...] have surrendered and because of that they have abandoned the battlefield without battling and defending what belongs to us
- (2) (speaking about Podemos) Estamos ante un enemigo.
We are in front of an enemy
- (3) Hemos venido a señalar a los culpables [...] de la ruina de España, y a combatirles (2018)
We have come to point at those responsible for the ruin of Spain, and to fight them
- (4) Parece que no se puede combatir la imposición lingüística en Cataluña sin... (2016)
It seems we cannot fight the linguistic imposition in Catalonia without...
- (5) Ninguna encuesta fue capaz de predecir que Andalucía iba a iniciar la reconquista desde el sur (2019)
No poll was able to predict that Andalusia was going to begin the reconquest from the south

We see that there is a clear communicative strategy. Out of these examples, and many others in the speeches, we can construct a whole story: there is a war going on expressed through a very powerful CONFLICT metaphor (POLITICS IS WAR). This war was almost lost because those who were supposed to fight it, have not done so (1). Not only the oligarchies, but also other parties from the right, like the People's Party, have given up. The enemies are left parties like Podemos (2), but also the independentists, EU politicians, etc., i.e. those who have brought Spain to ruins (3). The battles in this war are the different political measures that Vox does not want to accept (4), like language policies, or other events like the illegal referendum of independence in Catalonia. Nevertheless, this war can be reversed. When Vox made its first institutional appearance in the Andalusian parliament in 2018, it was the beginning of a "reconquest" (5), to finally win the war.

So, all the elements of war are there: VOX ARE SPAIN'S DEFENDERS / THE 'GOOD ONES'; POLITICAL MEASURES ARE BATTLES; LEFT POLICIES ARE TREASONS / THE RUIN OF THE

NATION and LEFT POLITICIANS, INDEPENDENTISTS, IMMIGRANTS, RADICAL MUSLIMS, ETC. ARE THE ENEMY. Enemies, however, do not become such by chance. There are also a series of conceptual metaphors that justify this consideration: *la democracia ha sido secuestrada por los partidos políticos* (POLITICAL PARTIES (other than Vox) ARE KIDNAPERS, 2017), *una dictadura progre y separatista* (LEFT-WING AND INDEPENDENTIST POLITICIANS ARE DICTATORS, 2019). So, there is an enemy who attacks, destroys, ruins, invades, betrays, and kidnaps³, among other things. These metaphors artificially build an enemy that is not there, representing it as having illegitimately obtained the power. Therefore, a legitimate and responsible action would be throwing this “enemy” out of power.

There are several reasons that could justify the high frequency of WAR metaphors in Vox’s speeches. This is not an isolated fact, since this type of metaphor is frequent as well in other fields of discourse, such as sports (Kellet, 2002) or business (Liendo, 2001) discourse. So, it would appear that WAR metaphors are, to some degree, conventionalized. This is quite relevant, since it has been shown that conventional figurative language is understood faster than “novel” one (Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). Logically, then, using conventional metaphors in a speech that deals with the complexity of politics could help the audience understand it easier, thus conveying the message in a more efficient way. However, we cannot forget that, even if conventional, there are ideological decisions behind this use of metaphor. First, WAR metaphors are highly emotional (Flusberg *et al.*, 2018: 4), involving a sense of urgency, risk and fear, which may call for quick social action. Furthermore, it develops the schema of a fight between the good ‘us’ and the evil ‘them’, contributing to a strategy of polarization in which the other is not considered as a political opponent, but as an enemy that must be defeated.

5.2.2. Metaphors of SPAIN

Other frequent metaphors in Vox’s speeches, especially in the years 2018 and 2019, are those using SPAIN as a target domain, to which certain properties of various source domains (PHYSICAL ENTITY, HOUSE and HUMAN BEING, see table 2) are mapped:

(6) si alguien quiere romper España... (2016)
if anyone wants to break Spain...

(7) nuestra patria tiene fronteras igual que vuestras casas tienen paredes; no queremos entre nosotros a quienes dan una patada en la puerta (2019)
our homeland has borders just like your houses have walls; we don't want between us those who kick the door

³ All of these are linguistic metaphors used in the speeches, which, for the sake of reading fluency, have not been fully referenced.

- (8) la España viva ha despertado; aquellos que la consideraban moribunda [a España]; esa España viva [...] que abre los colegios, que atiende en los hospitales (2018); Porque España ha gritado “basta” (2019)
The living Spain has awoken; those who considered it [Spain] to be dying; that living Spain [...] which opens the schools, which takes care [of patients] in the hospitals; Because Spain has screamed “enough”

Example 6 shows SPAIN IS AN OBJECT / A PHYSICAL ENTITY. Here, Spain is conceived as a physical entity, a fragile object which can be broken (i.e. politically divided into two countries, Catalonia and Spain). This metaphor brings out several meanings that we normally associate with the action of *breaking*. First, breaking something is a violent act, which can sometimes even be dangerous. Second, a broken object is useless, something that has lost its functions and must be disposed of. Third, repairing a broken thing is often difficult, and sometimes even impossible. Thus, when listening to this metaphor, the audience is led to conceptualize the (potential) independence of Catalonia (*breaking*) as something undesirable that must be prevented.

In example 7 we find the metaphor SPAIN IS A BUILDING / HOUSE. Like all houses, this one has a door, and the owner of the house decides who can go inside and who cannot. In this house, the owner is ‘us’ (presumably, Spaniards who support Vox). However, there are sometimes people who want to enter our house without being invited and do so by knocking down the door. These people are illegal immigrants. The metaphor, then, depicts Spain as a house that is being trespassed by illegal immigrants; which is a criminal and violent act, and should therefore be stopped.

Example 8 shows SPAIN IS A HUMAN BEING (i.e. a personification). Spain is a living being which has feelings and reacts when it is being threatened. This metaphor usually goes along the metonymy SPANIARDS stand for SPAIN, allowing the speaker to map the properties of the population onto the abstract entity that is Spain. There are several reasons to use this metaphor: firstly, it creates a sense of community, one of the strategies of nationalism. Secondly, it hides the party’s agenda under an artificial ‘Spanish agenda’, so that the problems of one are the problems of the other. Thirdly, it simplifies the affairs of the state by identifying them as the problems of a person (who, apparently, is dying).

We may argue, for the following reasons, that these three metaphors are highly emotional and can raise powerful feelings in the audience: instead of choosing a building that may be negatively evaluated, like a prison, Vox speaks of a house. We associate the house to positive elements like family, comfort, etc. Similarly, the SPAIN IS AN OBJECT metaphor does not refer to a random object, but to one that is interpreted to belong to all Spaniards; otherwise the audience would not establish an affective relation to it. Regarding personification, it also appeals to our emotions because one of its goals is “to arouse empathy for a social group, ideology or belief evaluated as heroic” (Charteris-Black, 2011:61). Plus, all of these metaphors present a series of problems that hearers can easily relate to, since they belong to common aspects of life, and thus ask for simple

solutions that we would undoubtedly carry on if Spain really was an object, a house or a person. Nevertheless, in reality this is not the case, and so, comparing both domains seems too simplistic and ineffective in terms of a political agenda.

5.2.3. Metaphors of ISLAM and IMMIGRATION

In this section, metaphors regarding ISLAM and IMMIGRATION will be explored. Although in the speeches there are several WAR and HOUSE metaphors related to these target domains, they will not be analyzed here, since both source domains have been studied in the previous sub-sections.

- (9) no estamos dispuestos a deshacerla [la civilización occidental] en el multiculturalismo al que nos condena la inmigración masiva (2019)
We will not allow to dissolve Western civilization in a multiculturalism to which we are condemned by mass immigration
- (10) tenemos un gobierno cómplice de la invasión migratoria (2018)
We have a government accomplice to the migratory invasion
- (11) Debemos regular la afluencia de trabajadores extranjeros en función de... (2015)
We must regulate the influx of foreign workers on the basis of...
- (12) No pueden formar parte de nuestra sociedad porque el islam no forma parte de España (2016)
They can't be a part of our society because Islam is not a part of Spain

In example 9 we may see the metaphor IMMIGRANTS ARE SOLVENTS, which complements the other metaphor WESTERN CIVILIZATION IS A PHYSICAL ENTITY; one that can be dissolved. Not only does this example show that Vox only considers immigrants those people who are not Western, it also contributes to a de-humanization of immigrants, who are not presented as people, but as solvent substances. While dissolution is not inherently a negative process, we see that Vox considers it so, because it is associated to the verb *condemn*.

Example 10 shows IMMIGRATION IS AN INVASION. This metaphor clearly relates to CONFLICT and WAR metaphors and presents immigrants as invaders of Spain. The adjective *accomplice*, used to describe people who help commit a crime, also points to the metaphor MASS IMMIGRATION IS A CRIME. As in previous examples, these metaphors attempt to show immigration as an illegitimate and violent action, one that must be prevented.

FOREIGN WORKERS ARE AN INFLUX is the metaphor present in example 11. Using water metaphors to represent migrants is not a novel phenomenon (Neagu & Colipcă-Ciobanu, 2014: 205). We may argue that it has two main objectives: the first one, as has previously been seen, is the de-humanization of migrants, who are not seen as people but as a natural phenomenon. The second one is appealing to our schema of natural phenomena related

to water, which we often associate to disasters (floods, tides, etc.) In fact, if an *influx* is not regulated, as Vox wants, it may become a destructive force.

The phrase *Islam is not a part of Spain* in example 12 clearly shows the metaphor SPAIN IS A PHYSICAL ENTITY / OBJECT, which has already been analyzed in the previous sub-section. However, in this case the conceptualization is different, because the object is different. Spain here is represented as an object composed of other, smaller objects, or slots (we can safely assume that one of the slots is ‘religion’). So, with the religion slot being already full (by Christianity, presumably), Islam lacks a place within the country. This metaphor shows that Vox has a highly conservative view of Spain, rejecting any kind of change or modification in its religious system; in other words, religion is somehow part of the ‘essence’ of Spain, which should not be modified. According to Vox, Islam is something ‘extra’, ‘foreign’, that does not fit into Spanish society, and so must be left aside.

These metaphors show a conceptualization of non-Western migration as a substance, an invasion and an influx, but never as people who leave their home countries searching for a higher quality of life. Vox’s discursive strategy, then, seeks to oppose the view of immigration as an economic and culturally enriching phenomenon. Instead, immigration is a disruptive and destructive phenomenon that threatens the way of life of Spaniards. A similar analysis can be made in relation to Islam, which for Vox is an element outside the ‘essence’ of Spain.

5.2.4. Other relevant metaphors

Metaphors of WAR and metaphors using Spain as the target domain are the most prominent in Vox’s speeches. However, they are not the only ones. In this subsection, three relevant metaphors will be examined:

- (13) la dictadura del relativismo; una dictadura de partidos (2015); la dictadura de la corrección política (2018); una dictadura progre y separatista (2019)
the dictatorship of relativism; a dictatorship of political parties; the dictatorship of political correctness; a progressive and separatist dictatorship
- (14) impuestos asfixiantes; subir impuestos también es atacar el estado de bienestar (2015); impuestos abusivos que os arrebatan la mitad de vuestro salario (2018); impuestos confiscatorios; la libertad y la vida son sagradas, pero también la propiedad privada (2019)
stifling taxes; raising taxes is also attacking the welfare state; abusive taxes that snatch half of your salary; confiscatory taxes; freedom and life are sacred, but so is private property

- (15) Vox es la esperanza de tantos (2015); Vox [...] es un niño robusto (2017); este Miura de Vox al que hoy se ha soltado en Vistalegre; Vox es [...] la España alegre, la España decente... (2018); Vox es solo un instrumento (2019)

Vox is the hope of so many; Vox [...] is a robust kid; this Miura (breed of bull) that has been released today in Vistalegre; Vox is the joyful Spain, the decent Spain...; Vox is just a tool

As may be seen in example 13, Vox uses several metaphors (six throughout the speeches) where DICTATORSHIP is the source domain; and not only referring to its political opponents. There are also philosophical trends (*relativism*) and moral attitudes (*political correctness*). As mentioned before, in the WAR metaphors section, this metaphor uses the ‘OTHER’ as the target domain, so that the audience thinks that this ‘OTHER’ has illegitimately occupied the power. Ideologically, these metaphors are quite consistent with far-right ideology: for example, relativism goes against the strict-father morality, which clearly states what is right and what is wrong. Similarly, the left tends to confront the right (Lakoff, 2002). Furthermore, political parties are a part of the establishment, which Vox is supposed to criticize, as a new emergent political party in Spain.

In addition, neoliberalism is fundamental in Vox’s ideology, and this is shown in example 14. Taxes are associated to several violent actions like ‘stifle’, ‘abuse’, ‘snatch’, ‘attack’ and ‘confiscate’, some of which may result in death; all expressions which also project the WAR or CONFLICT metaphor. The use of ‘snatch’ and ‘confiscate’ shows a frame in which taxes are conceived as money that is wrongfully taken from people, instead of a tool of social solidarity and collaboration that the State uses to finance public services and redistribute wealth. The STATE, therefore, is a CRIMINAL, an ENEMY. Similarly, these actions reflect a frame or schema⁴ where taxes are a violent action carried out by the State. Moreover, private property is sacred, and thus altering it could be considered sacrilege. As we see, metaphors can be used to transmit Vox’s frame, which considers that private property equals freedom, so that any attempt to control it, such as through taxes, is illegitimate.

In opposition to the previous two examples, we see in example 15 positive elements associated to the target domain, which is VOX. Following the story and, thus socio-historical and cultural frame of Spain being conquered by the enemies, VOX IS HOPE. Vox, due to its youth as a party, is also a kid, but a ‘robust’, ‘healthy’ (physically and morally) one, which transmits a meaning of health and strength. This sense of strength is also conveyed in the metaphor VOX IS A MIURA / BULL, also present in example 11, which was convenient because the 2018 speech took place in a bullring⁵. Another interesting

⁴ A schema can be defined as a structure of background knowledge about an entity or an event, to which we also attach our own values and attitudes (Hart, 2010)

⁵ In 2018 and 2019, Vox chose symbolic places to hold their political rallies: both in Madrid, the bullring of Vistalegre and Columbus Square symbolize what is ‘Spanish’. In addition to this, Vistalegre had also

metaphor is that of the TOOL, also in 11, because it supports the anti-establishment rhetoric: Vox is not like other parties that have become an “end in themselves”; VOX IS A TOOL that will help society and take the voters’ will into the institutions. Finally, Vox identifies itself with SPAIN, but not with the whole country, only the ‘joyful’ and ‘decent’ Spain, that is Spaniards that defend bullfighting, hunting, the Church, etc. This metaphor not only allows Vox to say that its political agenda is Spain’s political agenda, because they are the same (in a strategy to increase its number of voters); it is also a method of explicit positive self-representation and implicit negative other-representation (“I am the joyful Spain vs. the angry/sad Spain, the anti-Spain”) (van Dijk, 2006b).

5.3. The story schema

As a conclusion to the main discursive features of Vox’s speeches, we can summarize most of what has been seen in the analysis as being part of the construction of a narrative which follows a classical structure. Following Lakoff,

In each story, there is a Hero, a Crime, a Victim, and a Villain. In the Self-Defense story, the Hero and the Victim are the same. In both stories, the Villain is inherently evil and irrational: The Hero can't reason with the Villain; he has to fight him and defeat him or kill him. In both, the victim must be innocent and beyond reproach. In both, there is an initial crime by the Villain, and the Hero balances the moral books by defeating him (Lakoff, 2003)

In Vox’s speeches we may find the Self Defense Story: Vox and its supporters are both the Hero and the Victim, who have suffered the actions of the “irrational” Enemy (the left, independentists, immigrants, Muslims, the media, etc.). Again, as has been shown through the WAR metaphors, Vox represents itself as fighting against this Enemy. Through this schema, Vox tries to influence the frame that their voters and affiliates construe of them. In other words, they try to turn what could be logically thought of them (i.e. they are a failure because they have failed to obtain any representation) into an epic story of “rising from the ashes”. This serves one main purpose: to fit into our own story schemas (with a victim, a villain, a set of chained events that leads to a conclusion, etc.), which in turn provides an affective component, because we usually feel identified with the heroes of the story and want them to succeed (Brewer & Lichtenstein, 1980). However, other goals of using the story schema may be the simplification of the complex political reality, as well as the legitimization of Vox’s policies; because, for example, if immigrants are represented as the Enemy, then it seems logical that Vox promotes measures to expulse them from the country.

been chosen by the left party Podemos for two of its most important conferences, so filling the bullring allowed Vox to represent it as a ‘conquest’ against the left.

6. Analysis of UKIP speeches

In this section, UKIP's speeches will be analyzed from a critical socio-cognitive perspective. The links to the speeches can be found in the Appendix. The first part of the analysis will be focused on the most frequent nouns, in order to find the main topics UKIP speaks about, which will serve as an introduction to the party's discourse. Following that, the metaphors used by UKIP will be explored, with a special focus on WAR, UK and IMMIGRATION/ISLAM metaphors. Finally, we will also take a look at how UKIP's discourse makes use of story schemas (Lakoff, 2003), through metaphors, in order to represent itself as the all-positive Hero, and its opponents as the all-negative Villain.

6.1. Frequent nouns

Table 2, on page 21 shows the most frequent nouns used in UKIP's speeches. In this table we may find many of the topics that UKIP considers key in its political agenda. The most frequent word, with a broad margin, is *people*, which may be interpreted as a focus on populism, the appeal to 'what people want'. The first main specific topic, however, is the *European Union* (95 instances), which seems logic from a party whose main objective is to achieve independence from the EU. Thus, most of its comments and criticisms are directed to the EU. Other nouns like *Brexit* and *referendum* are related to this topic as well. From their frequency, we can see how Brexit a key subject in UKIP's speeches.

Another topic of interest is the *party* (83 instances). As it has been explained in the methodology, these speeches were made in party conferences through five years, and so internal affairs are important for the audience (mainly composed of members and affiliates of the party). Other words that support this topic are *UKIP* or *member*. The field of economy is also reflected in the list: *trade*, *money*, *business*.

Immigration (41 instances) has an important position as well, combined with other words like *border*, since UKIP takes a hard stance against illegal immigrants. Finally, we can see that the *country* (103 instances) and its political system are highly frequent, with words such as *parliament*, *election*, *government*, *minister*, *vote*, *democracy* and *politics*.

6.2. Metaphor analysis

In this corpus of UKIP speeches, 336 metaphors have been found. Looking at Table 4, on page 22, we can see the most common source domains of these metaphors: WAR, PHYSICAL ENTITY, HUMAN BEING, etc. In this section, metaphors of WAR, BUILDING/CONTAINER, ISLAM and IMMIGRATION and STOLEN PHYSICAL ENTITY will be explored, in order to see how UKIP wants its audience to conceptualize some of the main topics in their political agenda.

6.2.1. Metaphors of WAR

Out of all of the 336 metaphors found in the texts, 48 made use of the source domain of WAR, the most frequent one. This leads to the assumption that, in UKIP's discourse, the conceptualization of politics as a military conflict plays an important role:

- (16) You rallied to the UKIP flag (2018)
- (17) [...] despite the combined forces of the political establishment, the media establishment and the international establishment, campaigning for a remain vote. They lost and we won! (2018)
- (18) There's been a lot of talk about the leave side being a divided camp (2016)
- (19) So we must portray this as not being a battle of left and right. It's a battle of right and wrong! It's a battle about who governs our country! (2019)

While these examples show the metaphor POLITICS IS WAR, highly common in political discourse (Flusberg *et.al.*, 2018), we may find a more specific metaphor that suits them better: BREXIT / THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN IS WAR. This is not to say that there are no instances of the more general POLITICS IS WAR metaphor in the speeches. There are, with representatives such as the conventionalized collocate "fight elections" (Burnes, 2011). However, the WAR metaphor is developed at the most when speakers refer to the Brexit referendum, which was, as has been explained, the central axis of their discourse.

From the examples, the mappings of the metaphor are clear: there is a conflict with two sides or *camps* (example 3), one commanded by UKIP (example 16), and the other by *the political, media and international establishments* (example 17). We may deduce from example 17, as well, that there was a "battle" (the referendum) which was won by UKIP and its supporters. There is also another "battle" being fought, in example 19, which is the battle to make Brexit happen, three years after the referendum took place. Finally, the goal of the war is exposed as well in example 19. Both sides seek to *govern the country*. As we can see, the WAR metaphor is a complex one, not only portraying two enemies fighting, but also camps, different battles, objectives, etc.

Brexit is a central topic in British politics, but also a multifaceted one, with international consequences, where opinion trends are not unified (there are those who defend a deal with the EU, others want no deal, others claim for a second referendum, etc.). So, the fact that UKIP chose to simplify this topic through WAR metaphors is not strange. However, WAR metaphors not only simplify Brexit, they also add an important ideological load to the message, contributing to polarization between those who want Brexit and those who do not, the bad ones 'them' vs. the good ones 'us' (van Dijk, 2003: 80).

6.2.2. Metaphors of UK/EU

This sub-section will analyze the metaphors that UKIP uses to frame what its audience think of the UK and the EU, the latter being one of the preferred topics of the country, according to the list of frequent nouns (table 2).

- (20) They argue that Britain isn't big enough. Britain isn't strong enough. Britain isn't capable and able of standing on the world stage and doing things for itself. (2015)
- (21) and for all of this, the really good news is that it's gonna cost us 55 million pounds a day to join the club! (2016)
- (22) the primary policy of UKIP was to achieve Britain's exit from the European Union (2018)
- (23) 46 years of membership of the European Union has rotted the soul of the political class in this country. it's been a cancer at the heart of our politics (2019)

Example 20 shows a personification, BRITAIN IS A HUMAN BEING. In this fragment, UKIP speaks of what its opponents think of Britain, but it is not the metaphor that is criticized, but rather the features of this 'human being'. UKIP disagrees with this conceptualization of Britain as small, weak and incapable, so the audience assumes that it believes the opposite. This metaphor allows UKIP to map the properties of a human being onto the country, so that we understand that STRENGTH and SIZE are ECONOMIC, SOCIAL and POLITICAL PROWESS; and STANDING ON THE WORLD STAGE IS ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. This metaphor is grounded on our own embodied experience (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 254), because, as human beings, we understand being healthy as positive, and being ill or weak as negative.

The metaphors THE EUROPEAN UNION IS A CLUB and THE EUROPEAN UNION IS A BUILDING appear in examples 21 and 22. First, we understand a club as an association of people with similar interests, that develops a series of activities related to these interests. Nevertheless, we also know that if we no longer want to be a member of a club, we can easily leave it. In order to cease EU membership, however, a complex series of procedures need to be activated, agreed upon, etc. A similar process takes place in the second metaphor, in which the EU is framed as a BUILDING that we may exit at will. It could be argued that these two metaphors hide the political and economic consequences of Brexit, which is clearly not as simple as stepping out of a building.

Finally, in example 23 we may see the metaphors MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU IS ROT / CANCER. The target domain (membership in the EU) is associated with two natural processes that are considered extremely negative in our society. On the one hand, if food becomes rotten, it cannot be eaten, it becomes useless. On the other hand, cancer is one

of the biggest causes of death in the world. Mapping these two sources to the EU, then, could lead to a conceptualization of this organization as something that we should stop or prevent, otherwise risking dreadful consequences.

6.2.3. Metaphors of ISLAM and IMMIGRATION

Immigration and radical Islam are two of Britain's most important problems, according to UKIP. Therefore, they constitute an important part of their public discourse:

- (24) [...] if we remain members of the European Union, it is a perfectly reasonable sane thing to say that actually our migration crisis will get worse (2016)
- (25) [...] they will use the migrant tide to flood the European continent with half a million of their jihadists (2015)
- (26) Michael Gove, as education secretary, took on those Trojan horse schools in Birmingham (2015)
- (27) [...] stop this constant dripping of poison in the ears of young British Muslims (2015)

The metaphor *MIGRATION IS A CRISIS* may be seen in example 24. This metaphor brings forward negative connotations: an economic crisis makes people poorer and lowers their quality of life, a health crisis may cause deaths, and so on. A migration crisis, then, is likely to be associated as well to such negative concepts as misery, death, trouble, etc. Similarly, the *MIGRANTS ARE A TIDE* metaphor in example 25 draws from the productive field of water metaphors (Neagu & Colipcă-Ciobanu, 2014: 205). In this case, it appeals to our mental model of a tide and its destructive effects: flooding cities, destroying houses or even killing people. So, both the crisis and the tide are extremely negative processes that must be prevented in order to avoid this destruction.

Example 26 shows the metaphor *JIHADISM IS A TROJAN HORSE*. In this case, UKIP criticizes that there are people trying to promote jihadism in British schools, using a metaphor that seems to be quite effective, because it transmits several meanings: deceit, treachery, invisibility, and eventually, destruction. As we know, according to the myth, the Greeks managed to conquer Troy by hiding inside a horse monument that was given to the Trojans as a gift. This metaphor seems creative and novel, although it had already been accounted for, but in a completely different field: informatic technologies (Gozzi, 2000).

The metaphor in example 27 is *JIHADISM IS POISON*, and we can relate it to the previous analysis of being a negatively evaluated element that society should seek to prevent. In addition to this, the metaphor also appeals to the literary background of its audience, since in the UK it is widely known that Hamlet's uncle killed his brother by dripping poison in his ear; which takes place in Shakespeare's play *Hamlet*. Thus, the metaphor not only

refers to killing; if they have the appropriate cultural background, the audience can also detect meanings of treason, lies, etc.

6.2.4. Other relevant metaphors

Apart from (metaphoric) war, the EU and immigration, which constitute an important part of UKIP's discourse, there are other metaphors that are also relevant to know how UKIP wants its audiences to frame different aspects of the political reality. In this subsection, the source domain of *STOLEN PHYSICAL ENTITY*, and the metaphor *UKIP IS A HUMAN BEING* will be explored:

- (28) [...] to take back control of our borders (2015); to win back our democratic freedoms and rights as British people (2016); we want our country back! (2017); you don't live in a democracy if you can't sack your government [...] So we need to get that back (2019)
- (29) Seven months ago, our party stood on the edge of destruction; you made UKIP's survival possible (2018); the members of UKIP saved the party (2019)

The metaphors grouped in example 28 can be summarized under the source domain *STOLEN PHYSICAL ENTITY*. They have been separated from the more common *PHYSICAL ENTITY* source domain because they had an unexpectedly high frequency (17 instances). Following the metaphor, it would appear that British people had a series of positively evaluated elements (freedom, democracy, the country itself) before they became members of the EU. The EU then took these elements from them, and UKIP argues that they should have them back. There is a sense of illegitimacy associated to the EU, because it has not simply borrowed some things from the UK; according to UKIP, the EU has taken away from them even inalienable rights like freedom. Example 29 shows the personification *UKIP IS A HUMAN BEING*. The context is relevant to fully understand this metaphor: the party's low results in the local and general elections in the previous years had left it almost in bankruptcy. This bankruptcy is represented as death; and the party survived because the bankruptcy was over. Therefore, one of the mappings of the personification is *ECONOMIC SOLVENCY IS HEALTH*. A political party needs money to function, and a human being needs to be healthy to function. The other mapping that we can extract from the examples is *PARTY MEMBERS ARE SAVIORS*. It is interesting to see how UKIP developed a metaphor to try to put their situation in a positive light, even if being almost in bankruptcy could have been interpreted as a negative fact by its members and supporters.

6.3. The story schema

As a conclusion to this analysis of UKIP's discourse, and as we have done in section 5.3, we can associate most of what has been looked at here to the construction of a

narrative following the schema of the Self-Defense story (Lakoff, 2003), which was explained in page 31.

UKIP is the Hero of the story, and the European Union is the ‘evil’ and ‘completely irrational’ Villain. WAR and STOLEN OBJECT metaphors, depicting the EU respectively as an ENEMY and a THIEF, support these interpretations. There is as well an initial Crime, which caused the creation of the party, which is the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, when the UK became a member of the EU. Initially, we would consider winning the 2016 referendum as the end of the story, where the Enemy is finally defeated. Nevertheless, once the referendum was won, the story expanded, including another actor: the British government became the Traitor, one who switched sides along the EU, not wanting to make Brexit real.

The choice of a story schema is not accidental. Firstly, by framing reality in terms of a structure that is deeply set into our own minds (because we have seen it in books, fairy tales, films, TV series, etc.), it allows UKIP to simplify the complex political reality in order to make it more understandable. Moreover, it also provides an affective component, in which we want the Enemy to fail and the Hero to succeed (Brewer and Lichtenstein). So, the story schema is not a product of chance, but a strategy used by UKIP in order to legitimate itself and its policies, which have the goal of ‘defeating the Enemy’ and making everything right.

The story schema requires that the Enemy is represented as completely ‘evil’, and the Hero as completely ‘good’. In order to do this, UKIP makes use of what van Dijk (2003: 43-44) calls “the overall strategy of most ideological discourse”: UKIP emphasizes its positive aspects and the negative aspects of the ‘other’, and de-emphasizes its bad things and the good things of the ‘other’. The result, then, is the artificial creation of two extremely polarized characters which indeed fit the positions of Hero and Enemy, allowing for the story to be conceptualized by the audience, but which do not exactly fit reality.

7. Discussion

After having analyzed both Vox and UKIP’s corpora in the previous sections, the findings will be compared and discussed here. In this this section, we will try to draw some conclusions from the data regarding the similarities and differences in the metaphors used by UKIP and Vox, and what this tells of how they frame (or want their audience to frame) the world.

First, both tables of frequent nouns (tables 1 and 2) show us the first differences between both parties: some may be attributed to the particular circumstances of each country, like the focus on Brexit and the EU by UKIP, and on the process of independence of Catalonia by Vox. However, other differences might not be simply caused by the country difference, but by the ideological difference. For instance, nationalism: if we

combine the instances of *country*, *Britain* and *UK* in UKIP's speeches (151 in total), the result is much smaller than the number of times the word *Spain* alone is pronounced by Vox (184 times), which combined with *Spaniard*, *nation*, *homeland* and *country* makes a total of 317 instances. So, we see that nationalism is key in understanding Vox, while not so much in UKIP.

Similarly, UKIP makes a stronger appeal to the *people* (150 instances) than Vox does (*Spaniard*, *citizen* and *people* add up to 100 instances), which might indicate a bigger focus on populism. UKIP is more interested as well in the economy (91 instances) and the political system (201 instances), while Vox highlights values and the family (94 instances). It is difficult to categorically state the ideology of a party, because they are not rigid, unchanging entities, and the ideological barriers may sometimes be vague, but from their choice of nouns, we can safely point out that Vox is a more nationalist party, with a bigger focus on tradition and values; while UKIP is more populist, and more interested in the functioning of the economy and the State.

Regarding the conceptual metaphor POLITICS IS WAR, one of the clarifications that have been made in the analysis is that this type of metaphor is not uncommon in political discourse in general, or at least so in English and Spanish (Flusberg *et.al.*, 2018; Hernández Miranda, 2014). Nevertheless, there seem to be relevant differences in the way both parties make use of this metaphor. Interestingly, UKIP uses less WAR metaphors in their speeches than Vox does (48 vs 78), even if its corpus is bigger. This indicates that the Spanish party is more interested in having their audience conceptualize the political scenario as a war. This is also reflected in the development of these metaphors in both parties: UKIP speaks, among other things, of *forces*, *rallying*, *camps* or *battles*; but Vox includes many more mappings and talks of *surrender*, *battlefield*, *battling*, *defending*, *enemies*, *fighting*, *conquering*, *ruin*, etc.

This great development of WAR metaphors in both parties leads us to believe that they were not a product of chance, but instead a product of a process of reflection. Thus, they were chosen for specific reasons, and these reasons should be explored: first, it has been argued that war metaphors are, to a certain degree, conventionalized in public discourse (Flusberg *et.al.*, 2018), and so they make communication more effective. They are a way to transmit their message better. Secondly, they are intrinsically polarizing because they create a situation of two sides: the 'good ones' vs the 'bad ones'; a division in which the audience is immediately positioned according the party they support. Following this, some scholars propose that, as polarization increases, the more moderate actors lose influence (McCarty *et.al.*, 2006). So, promoting polarization is likely to give more influence to those political parties situated at the far end of the ideological scale. If Vox (and, to a lesser degree, UKIP) is interested in polarizing through its discourse, that may situate it within an extremist ideology, because those are the parties that profit from polarization. In addition to this, Flusberg *et.al.* (2018:11) defend that "the vivid emotional valence associated with war can quickly activate a sense of urgency and anxiety, which may motivate further action under some circumstances". This emotionality towards war,

then, being transferred to politics, might end up legitimizing violence or power abuse against who is considered to be the ‘enemy’, but is actually the political opponent.

The use of the COUNTRY (and the EU) as target domains in Vox’s and UKIP’s discourses shows us differences and similarities between the parties. For instance, while they both recur to the BUILDING source domain, Vox makes it more specific, using instead the HOUSE. So, when Vox frames migration as a person trying to enter a house without being invited, there is an affective dimension involved, because the house belongs to our own personal, private sphere, and entering it uninvited is socially reproachable. On the contrary, if UKIP frames the EU simply as a building, there are not any affective consequences in leaving it, because we do not know what kind of building it is. So, both parties make use of emotions (or the lack of them) through metaphors. This may also be seen in how UKIP speaks of the EU as a CANCER, associating it to an illness that is considered to be extremely negative; and also in the notion of *breaking Spain* used by Vox, which presumes that SPAIN IS AN OBJECT that all Spaniards possess, and so breaking it is also negative. Using metaphors to explain the functioning of a national or supranational institution is certainly appealing, given the complexity these institutions possess. However, it may also be argued that they are misleading, since they let the audience think that the solution to the problems of the country is as easy as ‘leaving a building’ or ‘defending a house’, when in reality they often involve negotiations, conflicts of interests, approving or repealing laws, etc.

Both parties have a hard stance against immigration and Islam, according to their political programs, and the metaphors that have been analyzed show this. On the one hand, UKIP associates IMMIGRATION to events like TIDES and CRISES. Immigration is conceptualized as a catastrophe, which brings to the minds of the listeners notions like ruin, destruction and even death. Radical Islamism (jihadism), however, plays a different role: it is conceptualized as a TROJAN HORSE and POISON, which, although bringing to mind the notion of death as well, also involves other elements like stealth, invisibility, etc. Regarding immigration, Vox wants its audience to frame it in a similar way as UKIP, through source domains like INFLUX and INVASION. Islam, however, is conceptualized simply as an element that does not belong, that does not fit in an “already-whole Spain”.

The similarities of both parties in their conceptualization of immigration are not accidental. They answer to a strategy to de-legitimize and criminalize immigrants and multiculturalism; which may be attributed as well to a notion of a country and its culture as something rigid and immobile, which is not subject to change. In addition to this, if we consider, as does Vox, that only non-Western immigrants are negative for society, the metaphors become as well a way to legitimize social action, power abuse and exclusion against African, Asian and South American immigrants, who often are in a socioeconomic position lower to native Spaniards. Vox’s framing of Islam may also be related to the model of a country as an unchanging entity, which, already having Catholicism as a religion, cannot accept more religions. Even if UKIP is more lenient towards non-radical Islam, the metaphors both parties use show a strong rejection of diversity, both ethnic and cultural, which fits into the nativist politics that scholars like

Wodak (2015:31) and Mudde (2007:18) have associated to right-wing populism and the far right.

The source domain *STOLEN PHYSICAL ENTITY*, frequently used by UKIP, indicates that the party wants its audience to frame the EU as a thief; and not a small one, but one that has stolen freedom, rights or even the country itself. So, the EU is associated to illegitimacy. The goal of this metaphor would be to convince people to support leaving the EU, while at the same time hiding (or de-emphasizing) the role the UK had as a willing participant in the development and functioning of the European Union for more than forty years. So, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the EU was, to a certain degree, something given by the UK itself, and thus depicting it as an ‘evil’ thief who has robbed the Britons seems inaccurate and manipulative. The EU becomes a scapegoat for all the problems of the UK, a strategy commonly used by right-wing populism (Wodak, 2015).

The use of *DICTATORSHIP* as a source domain by Vox is similar to UKIP’s *STOLEN OBJECT*, in the sense that it involves a sense of illegitimacy, but it also differs because it is associated to oppression and violence. It seems that Vox goes a step further than UKIP in the depiction of its ‘enemies’. In addition to this, the concept of a dictatorship cannot be accidental, taking into account Spain’s history (with Franco’s dictatorship until 1975) and the accusations Vox received of being the ‘heir’ of Franco’s ideology (Dusster, 2019). So, the metaphor is a way of rejecting the accusations of closeness to the dictatorship, by saying that instead the dictators are the ‘others’. In addition to this, Wodak explains that one of the characteristics of right-wing populism is the breach of certain taboos in their discourses (Wodak, 2015: 13), and recurring to this source domain to represent democratic elements like political parties, considering Spain’s recent history with dictatorships, could be seen as one of these taboo breaches.

It has been argued that “the analysis of metaphor can help probe ideological structures and foundations in text and talk, and discern the concepts and ideologies purveyed in discourse” (Ng, 2018: 215). The metaphors used by UKIP and Vox prove this, since they have been used to analyze their ideological positions regarding aspects like immigration, the economy or international relations, among other things. It has been shown how UKIP and Vox’s discourses reflect, with slight differences, nationalism, populism, nativism, economic neoliberalism and a hard stance against immigration and Islam, among other aspects. It has also been shown how the metaphoric choices of both parties oversimplify complex problems in some cases, and directly manipulate in others, with the goal of legitimizing themselves and their policies, and de-legitimizing what they consider to be ‘the others’. This de-legitimation is often focused on democratic institutions like the EU or on vulnerable groups like illegal immigrants; building a discursive justification for any social and political action that could be carried out against them.

Another point of this discussion has been to show how the use of metaphors by both parties may relate to the strategies of right-wing populism. The creation of scapegoats, the breach of taboos, the appeal to nativist policies, and, in short, the construction of fear (to diversity, to migration, to the EU, etc.). So, both parties could be placed, according to their metaphoric uses, within this political family. Nevertheless, there are certain

differences between them. For instance, UKIP does not recur to nationalism as much as Vox, not does it attack Islam in general, but only radical Islam. Neither is it as focused on maintaining traditional values and religion and defending economic neoliberalism as is Vox. In addition, the surprisingly high use of WAR metaphors by Vox would indicate an interest in polarizing society that is not as present in UKIP (although UKIP also presents a high use of WAR metaphors). So, taking into account that party ideologies are not set in stone, and that there are differences specific to each country, we could conclude that Vox leans more towards the far-right than UKIP.

8. Conclusion

This project has analyzed, from a socio-cognitive perspective, and within the field of Critical Discourse Analysis, the differences and similarities between the discourses of Vox and UKIP, with a special focus on metaphors. From the analysis and comparison of both corpora of political speeches, we have reached the following conclusions, which at the same time answer our three research questions: first, the metaphors used by both parties reflect a right-wing populist ideology (perhaps more leaned to the far-right in the case of Vox), as shown by their promotion of nativism, rejection of immigration, neoliberalism, etc. Second, there are important resemblances in both parties' use of metaphors, but also variation, which may be attributed not only to slight ideological differences, but also to the specific situation of each country, showing that there is not a unified discourse within European right-wing populism. Third, both parties' discourses make use of manipulation, de-legitimation and criminalization in order to justify policies against vulnerable groups like illegal immigrants.

The limitations of this study are clear: while the amount of data is representative of the discourses of Vox and UKIP, these conclusions may not be extended to other European right-wing populist parties. Furthermore, due to the scope of the project, not all metaphors could be analyzed and contrasted, so there may have been smaller details not covered by the study.

This project shows the way for further research on the field of the analysis of far-right or right-wing populist discourse. The data compiled for this study has not been exploited at the fullest, so it could still prove useful to expand the project, including not only metaphor analysis, but also other areas of Critical Discourse Analysis. Other way to improve this research could be to expand the corpus with data from other European radical right-wing parties, which would allow us to generalize the conclusions for all Europe. Right-wing populist discourses, which explicitly try to differentiate themselves from what they call the 'establishment' or the 'elites', constitute a rich and socially relevant area of study in linguistics, which will undoubtedly grow in the next years.

The study of far-right discourses, which seek to impose nativist political measures and create a religiously, ethnically and culturally united society, should not only be

approached from a scholarly perspective, but also from a socially compromised position. Critical Discourse Analysis is not a neutral area of research, detached from society. Instead, CDA objectively studies language, but with the ultimate goal of discovering (and denouncing) how this language may be used to legitimize power abuse from those who hold that power. CDA is impartial in its methods, but partial in its goals. Therefore, analyzing Vox and UKIP's discourses has allowed to explore the metaphors they use, some of their strategies of de-legitimation of the 'others', etc.; all of these findings, at the end, being useful to show how these parties strongly reject diversity, multiculturalism and, in summary, any kind of cultural change coming from non-Western people.

In conclusion, the analysis of Vox and UKIP's discourses has allowed us to acquire a deeper knowledge, based on facts, on how these parties frame (and want their audiences to frame) the world. The study provides answers regarding the conceptualization of migration, the nation, Islam, the economy, etc.; all of which might prove useful when trying to counteract these discourses. Knowing how right-wing populism conceptualizes key issues of the political agenda is the first step to construe an efficient discursive alternative, with the ultimate objective of promoting cultural, religious and ethnic diversity as a way to enrich society. Whether this alternative is eventually construed or not, remains a question for other projects.

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10. Appendix

For the sake of length, the transcriptions of the speeches have not been included. Instead, the links to the speeches are below:

Vox

2015 : Evento completo Primer Año de VOX - Teatro La Latina 17 enero 2014⁶

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h8-3r2baC4Y>

2016 : Abascal (VOX) - Los partidos políticos y la Nación española

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FvIbU80jQps>

2017 : Conferencia con Ortega Lara y Santiago Abascal en Alicante

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KktqcqTxgis>

2018 : Discurso de Santiago Abascal en Vistalegre | #EspañaViva

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t_CIfZ5amIE

2019 : Discurso de Santiago Abascal en el cierre de campaña en Colón

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i6Fwxu8zSjk>

UKIP

2015 : Nigel Farage speech after Islamic attacks in Paris

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QH9fvLiGTXI>

2016 : Nigel Farage - Llandudno 2016

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pehGu7dp1tw>

2017 : Paul Nuttall in Bolton

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kyB-QYmq5Pg>

2018 : Gerard Batten speech at the 2018 UKIP Conference

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55G888WDRpc>

2019 : UKIP Leader Gerard Batten speaks in Durham

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4gCmWIEAKE>

⁶ Note that the video is wrongly titled. The title mentions the year 2014, but the event actually took place in early 2015 (on the first anniversary of the party).